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dons of the agency. The case of In re Topper61 involved an appeal by
the Ohio State Racing Commission from a judgment of the common
pleas court. One of the questions decided by the court was a proper
construction of Rule 261 of the racing commission. This was a matter
of law which involved only the rule, but, another issue involved a portion
of the Act concerning the admission of additional evidence in common
pleas court; these issues protected the appeal from dismissal. A properly
perfected appeal by the agency will be disposed of by the appellate court
in accordance with the provisions of section 119.12 of the Revised Code.
Under this section, when an appeal is properly perfected, the court of
appeals reviews and determines the correctness of the judgment. It will
follow the same procedure in arriving at its decision as that enjoined by
section 119.12 upon the common pleas court. Of course, the decision of
the court of appeals is based on the same evidence as that which was be-
fore the common pleas court. In the principal case the court of appeals
did not concern itself with the validity of the agency rule. It affirmed
on the basis of the lower court's conclusion that there was no reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence to support the Commission's order.
MAURICE S. CULP
AGENCY
Because of the lack of significant opinions rendered on Agency dur-
ing the period covered by this survey, Mr. Hugh Ross has not submitted
an article this year.
THE EDITORS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
A more accurate title for this section this year might be "non-attor-
neys at law." The three cases which will be discussed concern the
activities of a disbarred attorney and the unauthorized practice of law by
a workmen's compensation consultant and by a non-profit corporation.
ATTEMPTED CIRCUMVENTION OF THE EFFECTS OF DISBARMENT
Goings v. Black' will, perhaps, write the first lines of the final chapter
in the strange odyssey of one J. Harvey Crow through the courts of Ohio
61. 109 Ohio App. 289, 165 NLE.2d 19 (1959).
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and the nation. Mr. Crow was first disbarred in Ohio in 1935, reinstated
in 1950, and disbarred for a second time in 1957.2 Correspondingly, he
was disbarred by the federal district court in 1937, reinstated in 1950
and disbarred again in 1959. The United States Supreme Court refused
to review the second of the Ohio disbarment proceedings upon a writ of
certiorari' and entered its own order disbarring Mr. Crow in 1959.*
It would have appeared that a final determination of Mr. Crow's
fitness to practice law had been made and that he was now effectively
barred from appearing before the courts as an attorney. However, in
State ex rel. Crow v. lVeygandt,5 Mr. Crow sought to be made a party
to a case for malicious prosecution on the ground that he had acquired
a financial interest in such cause by an assignment of a part of the claim
from the original party plaintiff. The Ohio Supreme Court decided the
case on the basis of the non-assignability of this type of cause of action.
The court was not unaware of what appeared to be the true purpose of
Mr. Crow's actions. Judge Taft commented:
However, we would be less than human if we were not curious as
to whether relator can circumvent his disbarment by acquisition of "a
financial interest" in a pending case.6
Unfortunately the court did not attempt to answer the riddle it posed.
In Goings v. Black,7 the issue was squarely presented. Mr. Crow had
been assigned, in a pending personal injury case, the type of claim that
could be assigned. There was a motion by Mr. Crow that he be made a
party to the pending case because of his financial interest in the case.
Judge Leach of the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, in
denying the motion, held that Mr. Crow could not circumvent his dis-
barment by such a ruse. Doubting the validity of such an assignment
if made to a practicing attorney, the court felt that considerations of
public policy (which were not enumerated) clearly made the assignment
improper where a disbarred attorney was concerned. Furthermore, the
court said:
It should be apparent that if a contingent fee contract of a licensed
attorney at law is enforceable only as an "equitable assignment," a con-
tingent fee assignment to a disbarred attorney surely could not be upheld
as giving him the right to intervene as a party to the tort action (with
1. 164 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
2. A complete history of Mr. Crow's difficulties in relation to his disbarments can be found
in In re Crow, 181 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
3. Crow v. Faulkner, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
4. In re Disbarment of Crow, 359 U.S. 1007 (1959).
5. 170 Ohio St. 81, 162 N.E.2d 845 (1959).
6. Id. at 83, 162 N.E.2d at 847.
7. 164 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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the incidental right of representing himself and thus necessarily in actual
effect representing his "client").8
There can be little doubt that the ultimate result reached by the
court is the only sensible one if the disbarment proceeding is to be an
effective tool for policing the legal profession. One might wish for a
more definitive statement by the court of the policy considerations be-
hind the decision. It is clear that the court must look at the substance
of the matter and not just at the form if the effects of disbarment are
not to be evaded. It is equally clear that the court must be able to give
practical effect to the disbarment order.
One further comment that is suggested by Mr. Crow's adventures is
that it might be appropriate for a study to be made to evaluate the pro-
cedures authorized and the standards utilized in disbarment and reinstate-
ment proceedings.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Two cases arose during the past year which presented differing
aspects of the problem of what acts constitute the unauthorized practice
of law.'
In Special Master Commissioners v. McCahan,0 the court had to de-
termine whether a layman, who holds himself out as being qualified to
advise on claims and represent claimants before the Industrial Commis-
sion of Ohio and the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. The respondent, McCahan, was a
former member of the Canton Regional Board of Claims of the Industrial
Commission of Ohio and had engaged in his workmen's compensation
service for approximately eighteen years. The court looked at the char-
acter of the acts being performed by McCahan, and not the place of
performance. The court concluded that: in appearing on behalf of
claimants before the various agencies, in preparing notices of appeal
from rulings, in preparing other forms and papers, and in giving advice
to claimants in relation to their rights, McCahan had engaged in the
practice of law which should be prevented by the issuance of an injunc-
tion.
Of the various acts which lawyers characteristically perform,11 the
8. Id. at 927.
9. For statutory provisions regulating the authorized and unauthorized practice of law, see
OHIO RBv. CoDE ch. 4705.
10. 83 Ohio L. Abs. 1 (C.P. 1960). See also discussion in Administrative Law and Pro-
cedure section, p. 445 supra, and in Workmen's Compensation section, p. 594 infra.
11. Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 NE. 650 (1934)
syllabus I sets forth the following acts as acts constituting the practice of law: (1) conduct
of cases in court; (2) the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidental to proceed-
ings before judicial bodies; (3) conveyancing; (4) the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds; and (5) generally, advising clients in relation to matters connected with the law.
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court seemed most impressed by the advice-giving function of attorneys
in relation to legal matters.
The court is dearly of the opinion that the giving of advice as to
whether a daim is good or not is the giving of advice as to legal rights.
This is essentially the character of the service that is performed by an
attorney in the practice of law.'2
The second case concerning the unauthorized practice of law was
In re Battelle Memorial Institute.'3 Battelle is a non-profit corporation
engaged in scientific research for itself and for others. Because it is
likely that a patentable invention may be created during the course of re-
search on any given project, Battelle requires its employees to agree to
assign all such inventions made by the employee to Battelle. In turn,
Battelle's agreements with its clients provide that Battelle will notify the
client of any patentable invention made during the course of research on
the client's project, and further provide that Battelle will assign all rights
to the client if the client so elects. In the meantime, Battelle's legal
department begins to process the patents for the inventions they deem
worthwhile.
The court stated that until the client indicates that it intends to ac-
quire the invention, the Battelle lawyers are rendering services solely to
Battelle and that this is permissible. The court had to further determine
if Battelle could use its salaried legal staff to process patent claims for the
benefit of its clients after they notified Battelle of their intention to claim
the inventions. The court issued an injunction against Battelle, holding
that Battelle was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law when it
had its law staff render opinions as to the patentability of inventions,
possible infringement and interference, and process the patent claims
through the United States Patent Office, after the client had notified
Battelle of its intention to claim the invention.
The court was very concerned with the adverse effect that action of
the type carried on by Battelle would have on the attorney-client relation-
ship, that is, the split loyalty of Battelle's legal staff to Battelle and to
the client when the legal staff attempts to give advice about the inven-
tions.
Neither the McCahan nor the Battelle case is startling on its facts or
the impact of its decision. They appear to be simple examples of the
policing functions which the bar and the courts are authorized to perform
to insure the highest quality of professional competence in the law.'4
12. Special Master Comm'rs v. McCahan, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 12 (C.P. 1960).
13. 170 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
14. See Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934)
concerning the power of the court to act in unauthorized practice of law cases. See also
Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 353 (C.P. 1960) which was heard with
the principal case discussed and in which the court issued a separate opinion discussing its
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There are, however, deeper implications. If the giving of advice in
regard to the law is the chief characteristic of the lawyer, one would
be hard put to distinguish the services rendered by McCahan and Battelle
from those rendered by other non-lawyer experts in areas which have a
strong legal content. For example, "tax consultants," accountants (certi-
fied and otherwise) and accounting firms not only fill out income tax
forms for their clients, but advise their clients as to deductions permitted
under the law, exemptions permitted under law, etc., and the course of
action which will lead to greater tax savings next year.'5 Certainly, if
the fact that McCahan appeared before the various agencies was removed
from the record, the court's decision would be unchanged. Likewise, if
Battelle's clients delivered all the patent papers to the patent office, the
result would be the same. It would appear that those who prepare tax
forms and advise others on tax problems would not escape a charge of
unauthorized practice of law merely because they did not appear before
the tax tribunals nor deliver the completed tax forms to the proper re-
ceptacle. The whole mass of persons who fill out and give advice regard-
ing income taxes could be subjected to the sanction of the courts if the
court or the bar should ever be so inclined.
Certainly, the public should be protected from the non-lawyer who
like a gypsy gives his advice, packs his tent, and steals away into the night
- leaving his client holding a bagful of legal problems, tax and others
included. On the other hand it may well be time for the lawyer to rec-
ognize that non-lawyers who are competently trained in their professions
by education and experience (such as certified public accountants in the
tax field) may be better able to advise on matters concerning rights and
obligations under the law than the ordinary attorney who is not a special-
ist in the field.' 6 This is not a plea to open the ranks of the law to all
shapes, sizes, and varieties of non-lawyer specialists. However, it may
be time for the lawyer to recognize that the high degree of specialization
in the law today will require either an increase in the number of quali-
fied legal specialists in particular fields or the acceptance of the necessity
of permitting non-lawyer specialists to give advice in their fields even if
by so doing they are crossing into the lawyer's domain.
A major problem concerning acceptance of the non-lawyer specialist
would be proper policing so that the public is protected from the incom-
power to hear, determine and enjoin Battelle from engaging in acts constituting the practice
of law.
15. The problem of the proper relationship between the law and accounting professions was
recently considered in Accounting-Taw Issue, 36 U. DET. L.J. 397-489 (1959). In particu-
lar, see Comment, 36 U. DETr. LU. 464 (1959).
16. It is interesting to note that at least 75% of the single requests for the annual tax sym-
posium issue of the WESTBRN Rn SmvE LAw REvmw come not from attorneys, but from
accountants.
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